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 ABSTRACT 
 
By the end of 2010, there are 85 firms are listed in both China’s A- and B-share 
stock markets. With the identical issuing companies, trading rules, voting rights and 
dividends policies, B shares have been selling at a discount relative to A-share 
counterparts, which is considered as a puzzle over years.  
This thesis characterizes three major factors responsible to the price differences 
between A- and B-share markets: market friction, greater fool factor, and Hurst 
exponent (market efficiency) factor. More specifically, the results show that in 
Chinese stock markets institutional investors help to stabilize the stock prices; the 
results also indicate that time series standard Brownian motion are not responsible for 
the price differences.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
What determines asset prices? The standard theory in financial economics, the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), argues prices are always consistent with the 
‘fundamentals’; and equilibrium prices are passively achieved by the market, because 
an efficient market should ‘fully reflect all available information’ (Fama, 1991). 
However, one question arose when scholars attempted to shed some lights on how 
securities are traded in the market, that is whether the equilibrium price consistent 
with the ‘fundamentals’ would be achieved by the market? China’s stock markets have 
experienced tremendous growth and development since the two stock exchanges—
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) were founded 
in 1990, forming what is referred to as the A-share market. Two years later, in 1992, 
Chinese securities markets opened a door to foreign investors and created the B-share 
market in both Shanghai and Shenzhen. Initially, domestic investors only traded in the 
A-share market while foreign investors traded in B-share market. After reforms were 
implemented in 2001, domestic Chinese retail investors have been allowed to trade in 
B-share market. With the identical issuing companies, trading rules, voting rights and 
dividends policies as A shares, it has been observed that B shares have historically 
sold at discount relative to their A-share counterparts. However, according to The Law 
of One Price, if two assets have the same payoffs (in every state of nature), then given 
the weak form of efficient markets, they must trade at the same price. Thus, the price 
disequilibrium between A- and B-share markets is considered as a puzzle and has 
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attracted the interest of numerous researchers (Sun and Tong 1999, Chakravarty, 
Sarkar and Wu 1998, Chui and Kwok 2001). 
 
Some existing studies have offered the possible explanations to the price 
disequilibrium between A- and B-share markets. For example, the demand and supply 
theory1 suggest that B-share price discount is due to the limited demand from foreign 
investors. Also, since B shares have more substitutes B-share investors are facing a 
more elastic demand curve than A-share investors. Hence, any softening of supply will 
result in B shares trading at lower prices. However, unless the demand for A-shares 
becomes more elastic as supply increases (which is entirely possible in a behavioral 
driven market) for such an argument to hold in general, one would likely observe 
positive and negative oscillations as shares are released or withheld from markets. 
Other studies argue that the large price discount of B shares is due to market 
segmentation and information asymmetry2. Particularly, foreign investors have limited 
information about Chinese capital markets but they actually receive news faster than 
domestic investors due to information barriers in China. While much of economics 
abstracts from the mechanic of trading, microstructure theory focuses on how specific 
trading mechanisms affect the price formation process (O’Hara 1995, Madhavan 
2000). Demsetz (1968) was one of the first economists to analyze how the behavior of 
traders affects the formation of prices. Demsetz argued that while a trader willing to 
wait might trade at the single price envisioned in the Walrasian auctioneer framework, 
a trader not wanting to wait could pay a price for immediacy, i.e. liquidity. This results 
                                                 
1 See Bailey 1999; Sun and Tong 1999. 
2 See Chakravarty et al. 1998; Gao 2001; Chui and Kwok 2001. 
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in two equilibrium prices. Moreover, since the size of the price concession needed to 
trade immediately depends on the number of traders, the structure of the market could 
affect the cost of immediacy and thus the market-clearing price. In addition, the 
greater fool theory also concerns about the behavior of traders. It refers to those who 
buy an investment based on the premise they will be able to sell it at the profit to a 
“greater fool”. Many investors subscribe to this theory, but don't know they are 
engaging in it. In an ironic twist, they become the "greater fool," and are left holding 
the bag when the investment falls and they either can't find a buyer or they have to sell 
at a loss. In this contingent behavior, people's actions are based on the way they expect 
others to act. To the extent that people act in this way and that "greater-fool" 
speculating influences prices in financial markets. As a result, the mispricing has 
persisted and the financial markets serve as a source of economic disturbances rather 
than as mere transmitters. 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to consider a particular setting where an identical security 
(e.g. identical issuing companies) is traded in multiple markets, and to study why an 
identical underlying share are not guaranteed to be traded at the same price in A- and 
B- share markets. In this thesis, we aim to answer these following questions. First of 
all, we need to describe the price disequilibrium and analyze the causes focusing on 
the ownership structure of China’s stock markets to test whether the ownership 
structure along with the demand factors significantly impact the price differences 
between A- and B-share markets. Specifically, we are more interested in the 
individual-institutional structure and tradable-nontradable structure. Are individual 
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investors considered to be more irrational and less informed? As for capital control, do 
more shares tradable mean that more shares add liquidity to the market? And will a 
higher proportion of non-tradable shares in the market limit the liquidity and lead to 
mispricing of the stocks? Second, because of poorly educated investors and banned 
short-selling environment in China’s stock market we further exam the greater fool 
theory to study the price disequilibrium. The greater fool theory holds that markets 
behave according to the psychological whim of investors who enter the market en 
masse with each new investor believing that there is one more foolish than he to drive 
the price even higher. A market such as this would be entirely consistent with a 
demand model market, with demand becoming over more inelastic as supply shortages 
create angst amongst newly accredited investors. Finally, from the market efficiency 
point of view, this thesis focuses on the fractional Brownian motion. Can the Hurst 
exponent distribution explain the price disequilibrium? We utilize the 8-year quarterly 
panel data from 2003 to 2010 over the 85 cross-listing stocks in A- and B-share 
markets to investigate the causes of the price disequilibrium.  Here, we assume 
geometric Brownian motion as the null test of efficient markets. The alternative 
hypothesis is a fractional Brownian motion, which we believe has behavioral 
characteristics that cause extraordinary excursions from time to time which are viewed 
as being inefficient, chaotic, bubbled, contagious and so on (see Mandelbrot and 
Hudson 2004; Kahneman 2011; Akerlof and Shiller 2009). For the most part research 
has found only weak evidence that stocks or futures are persistently fractal (Turvey 
2007) largely because one way or another market corrects themselves. In other words 
it is perhaps more unusual not to observe periodic flirtations with fractional 
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characteristics within sub-samples of  stock returns, and this is entirely consistent with 
efficient markets so long as the entirety of the time series is consistent with a gBm. 
But if indeed fractional processes persist over the long run, then something other than 
efficient markets is at play. 
 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter Two gives a survey of China’s 
stock market. The review of the literatures that related to the possible causes of 
disequilibrium, greater fool theory and fractional Brownian motion is provided in 
Chapter Three. Chapter Four summarizes the data and sample selection. The 
econometrics methodology and the empirical results will be reported and interpreted in 
Chapter Five. Chapter Six concludes the paper with a summary of results and 
discussion of implications. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
CHINA’S STOCK MARKET 
 
China’s experience with its securities markets extends back to 1891 when foreign 
brokers founded the ‘Shanghai Share brokers’ Association’, which was headquartered 
in Shanghai as China's first stock exchange. In 1904 the Association applied for 
registration in Hong Kong and it was renamed as the ‘Shanghai Stock Exchange’. By 
the 1930s, Shanghai had emerged as the financial center of the Far East, where both 
the Chinese and foreign investors could trade stocks, debentures, government bonds, 
and futures; the Shanghai Stock Exchange grew to be the largest domestic securities 
exchange with 140 listed companies. The operation of Shanghai Stock Exchange 
paused in 1941 because of the World War II, and re-opened in 1946, but closed again 
since 1949 when the Communist revolution took place (Lavelle, 2004). 
 
Beginning in the late 1980s, enterprise reforms took place during China’s gradual 
transition to a market economy; many state-owned companies and collective 
enterprises issued shares to their employees in order to save on wage expenses. Local 
governments in China started experimenting with selling shares of collectively owned 
enterprises directly to private individuals in order to raise equity capital. Private 
property rights were reintroduced in the sphere of share holdings by law for the first 
time since its abolition in China in 1949, when the Chinese Communist Party 
introduced socialism in China. However, under the spirit of the socialist ideology and 
centrally planned economy, the policies were designed to improve the performance of 
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state-owned firms rather than outright transfer of their ownership to the private sector. 
Two over-the-counter markets were launched; one was in Shanghai in 1984 and the 
other was in Shenzhen in 1986, with only a handful of shares trading in these informal 
exchanges. Nevertheless, funding raised in this way proved to be vastly insufficient 
for the state-owned companies in their process of transferring from a planned to a 
market based institutions, so in the late 1990s and early 1991s, two stock exchanges, 
created respectively by the Shanghai municipal government and the Shenzhen 
municipal government, were established, with the central government’s formal 
approval. 
 
The milestone in the development of China’s stock market is the establishment of the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in the early 1990s. Prior 
to the 90s, the Chinese government had done some experiments in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen by setting up Over-The-Counter (OTC) markets where only small-scale 
trading of treasury securities and shares were processed, and the security prices on the 
OTC markets were determined by negotiation between buyers and sellers. By the end 
of 2006, there were a total of 1434 listed firms, and the total market capitalization is 
$1402.75 billion in both stock exchanges, and among them, Shanghai Stock Exchange 
accounts for $1123.70 billion.  
 
There are many publications about China’s stock market from which we can find 
detailed insights about the evolution of China’s stock market. Green (2003) and 
Walter and Howie (2003) have provided a detailed information of the history of 
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China’s equity market and state-owned enterprises reform from mid 1980s to early 
2000s, right before the ownership structure reformation of China’s stock market. The 
Chinese listed firms differ from the listed firms in other developed or emerging stock 
markets because approximately two-thirds of non-tradable shares issued by the listed 
firms were ultimately controlled by the state, while only the one-third of shares can be 
traded in the stock market. Although Chinese authorities arranged to make one-third of 
shareholdings of the listed state-owned enterprises available to private investors, state-
owned enterprises could hardly improve their performance and corporate governance 
without changing control rights of the listed firms (Groves et al. 1994; Gao 1996; Cao 
et al. 1999; Allen et al. 2005). 
 
There is no doubt that two-thirds ownership of non-tradable shares by the state has 
restrained the performance of the Chinese listed state-owned enterprises. Also, it has 
become a critical barrier to the development progress of China’s stock market. From 
the early 2000s, the Chinese authorities have made several attempts to deal with the 
problem of non-tradable shares on several occasions. The first batch of four state-
owned companies convert their non-tradable shares into tradable shares by 
compensating the existing shareholders in various ways such as bonus shares, cash, 
and options on April 29, 2005. This pilot program, launched by China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC), allowed the tradable shareholders to bargain over 
the transfer of non-tradable shares. In June 2005, the CSRC initiated a second pilot 
program involving 42 companies worth 10% of overall stock market value. On August 
19, 2005, this second program was successfully accomplished. Besides the non-
  - 9 -
tradable share barrier, China’s stock market has been making progress step-by-step to 
break down some other barriers. On February 19, 2001, the CSRC announced that 
Chinese residents would be allowed to own B shares, which are shares of mainland 
companies and traded in both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges and 
denominated in US dollars (Shanghai stock exchange) and HK dollars (Shenzhen 
stock exchange). In addition, the CSRC and the People's Bank of China (PBOC) 
introduced the QFII (Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor) program as a provision 
for foreign capital to access China's financial markets in November 2002. Chinese 
authorities established QDII (Qualified Domestic Institutional Investors) on April 13, 
2006, which is a scheme under which selected government--authorized domestic 
institutional investors are allowed to invest in overseas capital markets under the 
foreign exchange control system in China. This facility is restricted to investment in 
the capital market of Hong Kong only. These policies are partially responsible for the 
“price discount puzzle”, for example, part of B share discount declined after February 
19, 2001. QFII and QDII are with limited application by institutional investors, a 
thorough integration of three sub-markets, as yet, remains incomplete (Neftici et al., 
2007; http://www.csrc.gov.cn). 
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Figure 1 Chronology of the historical events of the China’s stock market 
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2.1 Overview of China’s stock markets 
 
Market segmentation is one of the most dominating features for China’s stock market 
as discussed in the previously. Chinese listed firms have two classes of shares 
outstanding: shares which are traded domestically in mainland China, including A-
share and B-share; and shares listed in overseas markets, such as H-share, N-share, S-
share and T-share, representing shares issued in Hong Kong, the U.S, Singapore, and 
Japan markets. Segmentation further exists within the domestic shares—A shares are 
traded by domestic investors while B shares are denominated in foreign currencies and 
traded by foreign investors. Plus, another unparalleled feature of ownership structures 
in China’s stock market is its tradable and non-tradable shares. Non-tradable shares 
typically owned the state.  
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3 The numbers of individual and institutional accounts are decreasing over time because of macroeconomics 
conditions. During economic hardship people may withdraw their accounts from the stock markets.  
Table 1 China’s Stock Market Overview 
Panel A: Shanghai Exchange 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 A share B share A share B share A share B share A share B share 
No. of Listings 884 54 860 54 854 54 850 54 
Issued Volume(billion) 21,810 130 16,536 124 15,289 121 14,058 115 
Market Value(billion) 178,000 1,007 183,800 855 96,875 377 268,497 1,342 
Trading Volume(billion) 25,812 152 33,477 203 16,207 104 23,931 394 
Deals Traded(million) 1,653 8 2,133 10 1,273 6 1,599 19 
Trading Value(billion) 303,216 1,096 345,443 1,069 179,762 668 301,960 3,474 
Tradable Volume(billion) 15,901 130 11,455 124 4,795 121 3,284 115 
Tradable Market Value(billion) 141,330 1,007 113,950 855 31,929 377 63,191 1,342 
Individual Investors(accounts) 75,555,733 - 69,108,156 - 60,883,6463 1,453,400 54,468,593 1,422,000 
Institutional Investors(accounts) 307,508 - 290,514 - 262,770 11,885 250,615 3,030 
Total Accounts 75,863,241 - 69,398,670 - 61,146,416 1,465,285 54,719,208 1,425,030 
         
Panel B: Shenzhen Exchange 
No. of Listings 455 54 454 55 455 55 464 55 
Issued Volume(million) 292,888 14,995 270,110 14,916 230,362 13,846 210,445 12,817 
Market Value(million) 3,984,450 95,675 1,742,156 42,329 4,544,363 121,155 1,498,071 79,551 
Trading Volume(million) 1,385,000 25,517 651,628 11,426 1,093,697 32,584 538,756 17,695 
Deals Traded 918,307,700 8,189,763 527,046,338 4,412,890 741,164,554 12,077,341 243,983,287 4,877,318 
Trading Value(million) 13,834,451 102,872 6,949,071 55,472 13,663,734 231,094 2,890,045 68,029 
Tradable Volume(million) 206,616 14,794 161,652 14,702 124,909 13,549 100,343 11,879 
Tradable Market Value(million) 2,770,379 94,733 981,711 41,820 2,351,229 119,623 707,373 77,795 
Individual Investors(accounts) 74,668,041 - 68,169,084 - 59,865,636 926,700 53,244,974 899,900 
Institutional Investors(accounts) 267,548 - 250,044 - 223,358 11,500 203,487 10,400 
Total Accounts 74,935,589 - 68,419,128 - 60,088,994 938,200 53,448,461 910,300 
         
Panel C: Total Chinese Stock Market 
No. of Listings 1,339 108 1,314 109 1,309 109 1,314 109 
Issued Volume(billion) 22,103 145 16,807 138 15,520 135 14,268 128 
Market Value(billion) 181,984 1,103 185,542 898 101,420 498 269,995 1,421 
Trading Volume(billion) 27,197 178 34,128 214 17,301 137 24,470 412 
Deals Traded(million) 2,572 16 2,660 14 2,014 18 1,843 23 
Trading Value(billion) 317,050 1,199 352,392 1,124 193,426 899 304,850 3,542 
Tradable Volume(billion) 16,108 145 11,617 138 4,920 135 3,384 127 
Tradable Market Value(billion) 144,101 1,102 114,931 897 34,281 496 63,898 1,419 
Individual Investors(accounts) 150,223,774 - 137,277,240 - 120,749,282 2,380,100 107,713,567 2,321,900 
Institutional Investors(accounts) 575,056 - 540,558 - 486,128 23,385 454,102 13,430 
Total Accounts 150,798,830 - 137,817,798 - 121,235,410 2,403,485 108,167,669 2,335,330 
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Table 1 gives an overview of China’s stock market. There are currently 1,339 stocks 
listed in A-share market and 108 stocks listed in B-share market. And there are 85 
companies listed in both A-share and B-share markets. A shares are quoted in Chinese 
RMB, while B shares are quoted in foreign currencies (B Shares listed in Shanghai 
Stock Exchange are listed in US dollars and B Shares in Shenzhen Stock Exchange are 
listed in Hong Kong dollars). A-share market is open to Chinese domestic retail and 
institutional investors, while B-share market is open to foreign investors and Chinese 
domestic retail investors, not including domestic institutional investors. Except those 
difference mentioned above, the B shares and A-share counterparts are identical—they 
have the same voting rights, dividends and trading rules. 
 
The market information in Table 1 from “factbooks” 2007 to 2010 is published on 
Shanghai Stock Exchange website and Shenzhen Stock Exchange website. It reports 
two pairs of shares: A shares & B shares and shares listed in SSE & shares listed in 
SZSE. From Table 1, we can easily conclude that A-share market is much larger than 
B-share market in different ways in terms of number of listings, trading volume, 
market capitalization and total number of participants. There are about 10 times more 
companies listed in A-share market than B-share market. And the market value of A-
share market is about 100 times of the market value of B-share market. The ratio of 
trading volume in A-share market over B-share market is about 150, and the ratio of 
tradable volume in A-share market over B-share market is about 100. The difference 
between the two ratios is because about 80% of shares in A-share market are tradable 
shares; while almost all the shares in B-share market are tradable. The huge 
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differences existing between the two markets in issued volume, market value, and 
trading volume further also suggest that A-share market is much bigger than B-share 
market.  
 
 
Figure 2 Market Values of A-Share Market and B-Share Market 
 
Figure 2 presents a comparison of market values between A-share market and B-share 
market. Market value in the graph is calculated by stock price multiplies the numbers 
of shares outstanding. From the graph, we can see that A-share market value is 
approximately 4 to 5 times the B-share market value. However, it also shows the great 
co-movement with A- and B-share market value. 
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Figure 3 B-Share Price Discount as Percentage of A-Share Price 
 
The B-share discount as a percentage of A-share price is calculated by using equation 
(  - )/  (Domowitz et al. 1997). Figure 3 shows how the B-share 
discount was changing from 1992 to 2011. The numbers in the graph is below 0 in 
most years, meaning B shares have been selling at a discount compared to A-share 
counterparts. Particularly, as mentioned in the previous chapter, prior to the market 
reform (year of 2001), B shares were sold 60% below their A-share counterpart prices. 
After the reform, B-share price discount decreased close to 20% below their A-share 
counterpart prices. The graph also shows that the price difference changes over time, 
which indicates time variance is related to B-share discount. 
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2.2 The features of China’s stock market 
 
China’s stock market remains a hybrid with planned and market-oriented components. 
It differs from other conventional stock markets by its particular rules. In general, a 
stock market consists of the stock exchange, listed firms and shareholders, and the 
foundation of the framework is an entity of private property with legal protection. It is 
hard to believe that in a country with a relatively short experience with the private 
ownership such as China, the securities and stock exchange can really exist and play a 
role as the established conventional stock exchange. On the other hand, the key role of 
the stock market should play is to mobilize and allocate capital resources in a market 
economy. The major motivation for the development of China's stock market was to 
mobilize private funds to finance state-owned enterprises, as well as to improve the 
performance of state-owned enterprises through public participation. An efficient 
securities market should have the capacity to assign the capital to the most productive 
sector. However, the Chinese stock market clearly favors state-owned enterprises 
without any consideration of their performance.  
 
Incorporation and listing of state-owned enterprises through IPOs is not an activity 
which is unique to China. Berkman, et al. (2002) showed that the median offering of 
IPOs was only 35% of a firm’s equity capital based on a worldwide sample of 384 
state-owned enterprises’ share-issue during 1977-1997. In most cases, especially in 
developed stock markets, the common shares issued by companies give the particular 
  - 17 -
rights to their owners, primarily the right to vote at shareholders’ meetings, to receive 
companies’ profits in the form of dividends and to sell the shares in the secondary 
markets. The owners of common shares enjoy these rights and are treated equally 
under most circumstances. In contrast, China has artificially created three categories of 
individual, legal person and state shares that have the equal rights by legislation.  
Individual shares are the only sort of shares that can be listed and publicly traded in 
the stock exchange markets. Legal person shares are created through the injection of 
assets from legal person entities, which include enterprises, institutions or authorized 
social groups. State shares are owned ultimately by the State Council. Legal person 
and state shares which accounted for two-thirds of the total outstanding shares of listed 
firms were declared non-tradable. This situation has changed dramatically since the 
reform in 2005. The owners of individual shares can be recognized by retail investors 
or employees of a company who have invested their own wealth in the company. State 
shares are issued to authorized government organs acting on behalf of the state in 
return injection of assets such as buildings, equipment, and land-use rights. The State-
owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council 
(SASAC) and local state asset management bureau currently mange the state shares. A 
distinct feature of ownership structures of the Chinese listed firms is that holders of 
non-tradable shares have exactly the same voting rights as the holders of tradable 
shares. Non-tradable shares cannot be traded publicly even though the company is 
publicly listed. Typically these shares belong to the state or to domestic financial 
institutions which are ultimately owned by the central or local governments. In other 
words, individual tradable shareholders tolerate the market risk while non-tradable 
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shareholders do not. A company may issue legal person shares to non-state investors 
who contribute non-state assets and these shares become standard legal person shares. 
 
The listed firms have different market prices in each market, arbitrage among five 
markets is nearly forbidden. For example, for firms issuing both A and B shares, 
although B shares has been traded at a large price discount relative to A share, there is 
no arbitrage mechanism to short A shares and buy B shares due to the restrictions of 
short selling and the restrictions on foreign exchange currency that the Chinese 
citizens can only purchase very limited amount of foreign currency. On the other hand, 
no conventional stock market exists in China for the transfer of legal person and state 
shares. Legal person shares used to be transferred through management buy-out and 
the shares were usually priced below net asset value. The undervaluation scandals 
such as management buy-out, the unfairness revealed information, illegal sources of 
funding, and lack of transparency are due to share mispricing (Slovin, Sushka, and 
Bendeck, 1991). Consequently, management buy-outs have been almost stopped since 
2004 by the Chinese authorities. State shares were transferred only among state 
entities at negotiable prices before non-tradable state-owned shares reform. 
Additionally, individual owners pay higher price for their shares than non-tradable 
shareholders because prior to the IPO the price is close to net asset value when the 
non-tradable shareholders launched their shareholdings. As a result, they pay far less 
than the IPO price and individual owners have to suffer this discrimination in terms of 
pricing. By the end of 2002, only 6% of listed companies had non-tradable shares 
accounting for less than 40% of total equity capital, while only 0.4% of listed 
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companies had no non-tradable shares at all (Walter and Howie 2003; Green 2004; 
Chen and Chen 2007). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1 Price disequilibrium  
 
Studies have been done to analyze the possible explanations of the price 
disequilibrium. For example, Bailey (1994) studies and documents the behavior of B-
share returns since the market was established. He focuses on the relationship between 
B-share returns and international stock index returns and finds that B shares have 
considerable diversification value. For his later study on international asset pricing, 
especially the Chinese stock markets disequilibrium, he explains the large price 
premium by the concepts focusing on foreign investor’s demand and supply of shares 
(Bailey 1999). Some other studies demonstrate that the price difference between 
Chinese A shares and matching B shares is correlated with many different factors for 
example, investors’ attitudes toward risk and the correlations between B shares and 
foreign shares; demand elasticity differences, liquidity and speculation; market 
segmentation and information asymmetry (Ma 1996; Sun and Tong 1999; 
Chakravarty, Sarkar and Wu 1998; Gao 2001). Specifically, Chui and Kwok (2001) 
find empirical evidence showing that the information flow is actually from B-share 
market to A-share market, meaning foreign investors receive news faster than 
domestic investors due to information barriers in China. To support and extend Sun 
and Tong’s (1999) concept centering on the demand elasticity difference, Yang (2005) 
proves that the number and trading volume of Chinese firms traded in the U.S. are also 
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related to the large price premium in A-share market than B-share market. In other 
words, the shares listed in the U.S. stock markets are another substitute for B shares. 
 
1) Liquidity Hypothesis 
From the point of view of liquidity hypothesis, the price difference between A shares 
and the matching B shares can be explained by the differential liquidity levels between 
the two markets. According to the existing studies, A-share market is more liquid than 
B-share market, which drives B-share prices lower than A-share prices to compensate 
for illiquidity. The differential liquidity levels may explain the time-series and cross-
sectional variation of the price difference (Bailey 19994). Sun and Tong (1999) find a 
positive relationship between the trading volume ratio (B shares over A shares) and 
the B-share discount, which suggests that relatively less trading activity in B-share 
market than A-share market drives the price gap larger.  
 
2) Information Asymmetry and Market Segmentation 
Researchers under this topic mainly test which market has more information over the 
other. Chakravarty, Sarkar and Wu (1998) argue that the discount in B-share market is 
due to foreign investors’ lack of information relative to domestic investors. They argue 
that difficulties of gaining information are due to language barriers, different 
accounting standards and lack of knowledge about the local economy. They develop a 
model focusing on information asymmetry and market segmentation, and derive a 
pricing equation for A shares and B shares. The results show that information 
asymmetry explains a significant portion of the cross-sectional variation of the B-share 
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discounts. However, Chui and Kwok (2001) argue and prove with empirical evidence 
that the information flow is from B share market to A share market, which is right 
opposite of what Chakravarty, Sarkar and Wu (1998) found. They argue that the 
returns on B shares should lead the returns on A shares, and this pattern of information 
flow is due to the segmentation in the China’s capital markets and China’s information 
barriers. 
 
3) Differential Demand 
According to the differential demand argument, researchers mainly focus on the share 
supply (shares outstanding) and demand elasticity (substitutes for A shares and B 
shares), and their influence on the stock prices. Under differential demand hypothesis, 
the demand elasticity of domestic investors is relatively lower than that of foreign 
investors. As a result, A-share investors would like to pay a higher price for the same 
stocks than B-share investors. Sun and Tong (1999) argue that the China’s B-share 
discount phenomenon is due to foreign investors facing a more elastic demand curve 
than Chinese domestic investors. They state that B shares have more substitutes than 
A shares, which makes the demand curve of B shares more elastic. The result shows 
that when more H shares and red chips listed in Hong Kong (which they believe are 
the substitutes of B shares), the B-share discount becomes larger. In my thesis, as an 
empirical proxy for relative demand of share, I use the ratio of number of shareholders 
in A-share market to B-share market. And as a possible proxy for relative share 
supply, I use the ratio of number of shares outstanding in A-share market to B-share 
market. Theoretically, the price premium of A shares over B shares should be 
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negatively related with share supply ratio and positively related with share demand 
ratio according to demand-supply equations.  
 
4) Differential Risk 
For the differential risk argument, researchers study the differential risk aversions of A 
shareholders and B shareholders. The hypothesis argues that Chinese domestic 
investors are highly speculative, which drives the A-share price much higher than B-
share price. Ma (1996) documents that “cross-sectional differences between prices of 
A shares and B shares are correlated with investors' attitudes toward risk and 
correlations between B shares and foreign shares”.  
 
5) Institutional vs. Retail Investor 
Sias (1996) states that, from an academic point of view, institutional investors are 
more likely attracted by less-risky stocks because of several reasons: (1) many 
institutional investors are governed by more strict rules, thus they are more cautious 
and conservative when picking their stocks, (2) greater institutional ownership may 
gather more information, and (3) institutional investors tend to be more rational than 
individual investors. Gompers and Metrick (1999) argue that “investors would prefer 
liquid assets over illiquid ones and would be willing to give up some amount of 
expected future cash flows to buy more liquidity, especially institutional investors”. 
Except for facing a stricter legal environment and being more sensitive to liquidity and 
transaction cost, the reason why institutional investors are so different is that they have 
better knowledge about historical return patterns and risk control. Some studies 
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provide empirical evidence on the stabilizing impact of institutions. Institutions buy 
shares from individuals in response to positive cash-flow news. And when stock price 
goes up without any positive news, institutions sell shares to individuals. Individual 
investors display “attention-based” buying behavior on days with high trading 
activities. In contrast, institutional investors do not show this buying behavior. If 
institutional herds all react to the same news, it will help with the adjustment of stock 
prices to new information faster and thus make the stock market more efficient. In 
other words, institutional investors may stabilize stock prices and help the stock prices 
move towards their fundamental values. Thus, the more shares held by institutional 
investors, the more the stock prices reflect the firms’ true values (Cohen 2002; Barber 
and Odean 2003; Bohl and Brzeszczynski 2005). However, a number of studies state 
that institutional investors have negative herding effect on stock markets. For instant, 
Gabaix, Gopikrishnan, Plerou and Stanley (2006) present a theory of excess stock 
market volatility, in which market movements are due to large institutional trading in 
relatively illiquid markets. And such trades generate significant extreme values in 
returns and volume. 
 
6) Tradable and Non-tradable Shares 
Tradable shares mean the free float in the market; and non-tradable shares are the 
restricted shares that cannot be traded in the stock exchanges. In order to ensure 
government’s control of state-owned firms, non-tradable shares were created and took 
up about 20% of China’s stock markets. Chen and Xiong (2002) find that the non-
tradable state-owned shares and legal-person shares in China have an average 
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illiquidity discount of about 70% to 80% when they are traded over the counter. 
Beltratti and Bortolotti (2006) show that the tradable shares investors are typically 
minority shareholders with little power to affect management decisions. Also, the 
limited free float available due to the existence of non-tradable shares makes the stock 
markets illiquid, volatile and speculative. Thus, by changing the tradable and non-
tradable structure (unlocking non-tradable shares and increasing tradable shares) the 
market would expect better liquidity given the substantial increase in the free float. 
The increase in the percentage of tradable shares will put downward pressure on the 
market, which will pull the A-share prices close to B-share prices.  
 
3.2 Greater fool theory 
 
In general, the greater fool theory is the belief that one buys a security in the financial 
markets not because you believe that it is worth the price, but rather because you 
believe that you will be able to sell it to someone else at an even higher price. The 
intuition of the greater fool theory originated from the Keynesian beauty contest. 
Keynes (1936) describes the action of rational agents in a market using an analogy 
based on a fictional newspaper contest, in which entrants are asked to choose a set of 
six faces from photographs of women that are the "most beautiful". Those who picked 
the most popular face are then eligible for a prize. A naïve strategy would be to choose 
the six faces that, in the opinion of the entrant, are the most beautiful. A more 
sophisticated contest entrant, wishing to maximize the chances of winning a prize, 
would think about what the majority perception of beauty is, and then make a selection 
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based on some inference from their knowledge of public perceptions. This can be 
carried one step further to take into account the fact that other entrants would each 
have their own opinion of what public perceptions are. Thus the strategy can be 
extended to the next order, and the next, and so on, at each level attempting to predict 
the eventual outcome of the process based on the reasoning of other rational agents. “
It is not a case of choosing those faces that, to the best of one’s judgment, are really 
the prettiest, nor even those that average opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest. We 
have reached the third degree where we devote our intelligences to anticipating what 
average opinion expects the average opinion to be. And there are some, I believe, who 
practice the fourth, fifth and higher degrees.” (Keynes, 1936)4. Keynes believes that 
similar behavior was at work within the stock market. This would have people pricing 
shares not based on what they think their fundamental value is, but rather on what they 
think everyone else thinks their value is, or what everybody else would predict the 
average assessment of value to be.  
 
Keynes’s insight opens a brand new window for us to observe the financial market. 
Traditionally, many financial researchers hold a view that the price of an asset should 
be equal to the current expectations of its future pay-offs by a representative agent. 
Some assets pricing literatures5 suggest that a lot of investors on average can be 
represented by a uniform agent that holds a certain belief and preference. By assuming 
the existence of representative agent, one can claim that the current expectation of the 
future pay-offs in the market should be in line with the representative agent’s current 
                                                 
4 The General Theory of Employment , Interest and Money, Page 140 
5 For example, Mconstatinides and Duffie 1996; Brav et al. 2002 
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expectation of the future pay-offs based on the martingale process. By applying the 
rationale in the assets pricing world, the calculation of asset prices not only requires 
the understanding of investors’ beliefs about future cash flows, but investors’ beliefs 
about other investors’ beliefs, and higher order beliefs as well. At the basis of the 
beauty contest, the greater fool theory states that it does no matter if the price paid for 
an asset is higher than the fundamental value, as long as the greater fool is willing to 
pay a higher price. The anticipation of other greater fools’ move is a typical higher 
order belief. Sun and Tong (1999) conclude that “the higher of the A-share market 
volatility relative to the B-share market volatility the larger B-share discount will be”. 
This means that Chinese domestic investors’ excessive speculative activities on A 
shares seem to be related to the A-share price premium, which in turn suggests a self-
fulfilling prophecy. 
 
3.3 Fractional Brownian motion 
 
Fractional Brownian motion (fBm) is simply an extension of the well-known 
Brownian motion to the fractal dimensions. It was first introduced by Kolmogorov in 
1940 when it was called Wiener Helix. Later, Mandelbrot and Van Ness gave the 
process its name fractional Brownian motion (Mandelbrot and Van Ness 1968; 
Campbell and Abhyankar 1978; Mandelbrot 1982). Different methods and techniques 
used to generate fBm have been documented in (Doukhan, Oppenheim et al. 2003). 
More recently, the generation of fBm using a wavelet-based approach has started to 
gain popularity due to its faster computational speed as compared to other simulation 
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methods (Pipiras 2004). However, the implementation requires the generation of 
fractional ARIMA sequences with a suitable scaling parameter.  
It was Mandelbrot who coined the parameter H Hurst exponent after the name of a 
British hydrologist Harold Edwin Hurst, who studied the yearly water run-offs in the 
Nile River basin (Biagini, Hu et al. 2008). In his study, Hurst discovered that the 
values of successive yearly run-offs show a certain level of dependency. This 
phenomenon could not be modeled using a process with independent increments so he 
developed a method that eventually became known today as the Hurst rescaled range 
analysis. A fBm with Hurst exponent H belonging to (0,1) is a continuous and 
centered Gaussian process with covariance. Each successive run-off could be thought 
of as the increment of a fBm characterized by a certain value of the Hurst exponent 
(Hurst 1951; Bassingthwaighte and Raymond 1994). 
 
A fBm starts from zero almost surely, has stationary increments, and is self-affine 
(Mandelbrot 1982). Hurst exponent, ranging from 0 to 1, emerges as a parameter that 
describes the degree of factuality in any stochastic processes. For H = 0.5, the fBm 
becomes a standard Brownian motion where the increments are independent. If H < 
0.5, the increments are negatively correlated resulting in a mean-reversion or ergodic 
process. When H > 0.5, they are positively correlated and lead to a long-memory 
process (Bassingthwaighte and Raymond 1994; Carmona and Coutin 1998; Alvarez-
Ramirez, Cisneros et al. 2002; Turvey 2007; Biagini, Hu et al. 2008). 
 
The standard fBm B(H) has the following properties:  
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1. B(H)(0) = 0 and E [B(H)(t)] = 0 for all t ≥ 0.  
2. B(H) has stationary increments.  
3. B(H) has continuous trajectories.  
4. B(H) is a Gaussian process.  
 
In this paper, we will use the scaled variance ratio technique from (Cannon, Percival et 
al. 1997; Turvey 2007) that is quite distinct but consistent with R/S analyses (Hurst 
1951; Mandelbrot and Van Ness 1968) to estimate the Hurst exponent of a fBm 
generated from an AR(q) process: 
 
 
 
which defines a power rule that can be used to estimate the value of H. 
 
Some existing studies have tried to test the problem that whether a market has or does 
not have long memory. The main findings from these studies are that the deviations 
from efficiency are associated with the degrees of development. Actually, they found 
the Hurst exponent bigger than 0.5 for emerging capital markets (Beben et al. 2001; 
Matteo et al. 2003). Cajueiro and Tabak (2003) use the Hurst exponent to test whether 
emerging markets are becoming more efficient over time. They suggest that developed 
capital markets are very efficient in terms of speed of information. However, in 
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emerging capital markets investors react to new information slowly. They find that 
Hurst exponents vary over time due to changes in the dynamics of the underlying 
return time series. This is not explained either by time-varying short-range 
dependencies nor time-varying volatility as the Hurst exponents are time-varying even 
after adjusting for short-range dependency and time-varying volatility. Furthermore, 
Eom et al. (2008) use Hurst exponent as the measurement of the degree of efficiency. 
They suggest that the Hurst exponent represents a measurement which has information 
values useful for the prediction of future price changes. Furthermore, we also found 
that the Hurst exponent is useful as standards that can distinguish emerging capital 
markets from mature capital markets. 
 
3.4 Calculate the Hurst exponent 
 
For the Hurst exponent calculation, we use the method developed from Turvey (2007). 
First, in our sample total observation of price for each stock are approximately 2500 
(daily stock price from 2001 to 2010). Then we get one and fifty days lagged prices 
for each stock.  
 
Second, we compute the percentage change in prices for each of , 
allowing for overlapping prices (k=1 and 50). Lo and Mackinlay (1999) argue that 
whether sub-series should be contiguous or overlapping. Ellis (2006) claims that 
overlapping subseries are clearly preferred for R/S analysis. There is no reason to 
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expect that the preference would be different for the calculation of scaled variance 
ratios (Turvey 2007). 
 
Third, calculate the variance, , for each k  
 
Fourth, the rations of the form  
 
 
Fifth, in order to estimate the value for H, we use the following regression  
 
with  Then from Eq.(1) and (3), we have the value 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
 
By the end of 2010, there were 1339 firms listed in the A-share market and 108 firms 
listed in the B-share market. Meanwhile, 85 firms are listed in both A- and B-share 
markets. To analyze the price differences between the two markets and its possible 
factors, we only include firms that have listed in both A- and B-share markets into our 
data sample. Therefore, we use quarterly data of those 85 stocks from December 2001 
to December 2010 to perform a panel data analysis6. We choose 2001 as the start year 
because after the reform in 2001 domestic retail investors have been able to invest in 
the B-share market, which was seen as a turning point of the markets. The ownership 
structure related variables 7  are retrieved from Resset Database, Bloomberg, 
Datastream and Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange websites. 
The greater fool related variables8  are collected from “Monthly Registered Stock 
Accounts” retrieved from CSD&C, “China Securities Depository and Clearing 
Corporation”9. Since the public available information of the CSD&C only starts from 
January 2003, our data series is limited to start from the same time. The ending date is 
December 2010. Therefore, a total of 32 quarters’ observations have been utilized in 
our analysis.  
 
 
                                                 
6 All 85 companies list in Appendix A and Appendix B 
7 Ownership structure related variables are volatility ratio, turnover ratio, number of shares outstanding, tradable 
shares percentage, number of shareholder, institutional holdings 
8 Greater fool related variables are newly registered retail and institutional investor stock accounts 
9 www.chinaclear.cn 
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Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2 Summary Statistics  
Panel A: Control Variables(means) 
Year  Price 
difference 
(%)  
Volatility 
ratio 
Volume 
ratio  
Number of 
shares 
outstanding 
Tradable 
shares 
percentage  
Number of 
shareholders 
(logarithm)  
Institutional 
holdings 
(logarithm) 
2001 7.9034 0.6872 5.5855 2.4395 0.473 0.542 -1.9591 
2002 8.8067 0.8489 22.9456 2.5045 0.483 0.5244 -1.6397 
2003 8.656 1.0819 35.6129 2.5099 0.488 0.4681 -0.6086 
2004 8.8979 1.091 38.0213 2.5797 0.497 0.4373 -1.8224 
2005 9.2796 1.1065 53.624 2.5955 0.507 0.5929 -3.1239 
2006 7.2204 1.1323 35.681 2.6738 0.773 0.6384 0.8775 
2007 6.6028 1.1185 36.2833 2.8032 0.953 0.4929 1.8856 
2008 7.3898 1.1503 72.8994 2.8861 0.975 0.5768 1.8252 
2009 8.4539 1.228 74.2746 3.0182 0.981 0.6785 0.9466 
Mean  8.1345 1.0494 41.6586 2.6678 0.681 0.5501 -0.4021 
        
Panel B: Hurst Exponent  
    Mean Max Min Median   
A-share Market 0.3623 0.5350 0.0823 0.3790   
B-share Market 0.5456 0.6112 0.5058 0.5415   
        
Panel C: Newly Opened Accounts  
Year  New retail accounts   New institutional accounts   
2003 736,163   8,460   
2004 853,618   7,299   
2005 438,076   5,262   
2006 1,505,086   13,749   
2007 18,700,000   58,818   
2008 7,195,270   27,516   
2009 8,563,236   33,467   
Mean 5,427,349.86   22,081.57   
 
Table 2 Panel A present the means for each control variable used in our regression 
model. From the second column of Panel A, we can see that the A-share price 
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premium is about 8% of the B-share price. The volatility of the A-share market is a 
little bit higher than that of the B-share market. The ratio of turnover rate changed 
tremendously from year to year, but the A-share market is much more liquid than the 
B-share market. The number of shares outstanding in the A-share market is about 2.5 
times the number of shares outstanding in the B-share market. Tradable shares in the 
markets increased greatly since 2005 when the reform10  started. After taking the 
logarithm of the number of shareholders, the numbers are above zero, which indicates 
that the number of shareholders in A-share market is more than that in B-share market. 
And after taking the logarithm of institutional shareholdings, the mean of 10 years 
institutional holdings are higher in B-share market than that in A-share market. Table 
2 Panel B reports the summary statistics for the A- and B-share markets Hurst 
exponent. The mean of the A-share market Hurst exponent is 0.3623 and the mean of 
the B-share market is 0.5456. According to Turvey (2007), approximate upper and lower 
90% confidence intervals for scaled variance ratio with N=2500, k=50 is (0.4550, 
0.5449). This means if a value of H between 0.4550 and 0.5449 there is 90% 
confidence that the time series follows a gBm. Hence, in our cases, the B-share market 
Hurst exponent slightly deviates from the 90% confidence interval indicating B-share 
time series does not follow a gBm. A-share market Hurst exponent is much lower than 
the lower bound of 90% confidence interval indicating A-share market time series 
does not follow a gBm either. However, based on Turvey (2007) 95% confidence 
interval for scaled variance ratio, the upper and lower bounds are 0.5539 and 0.4461, 
                                                 
10 As mentioned in the previous section, in 2005, the China Securities Regulatory Commission initiated the reform 
to transform non-tradable shares into tradable shares. The percentage of non-tradable shares is from 65% in 2005 to 
today’s 20%, which actually increased the shares supply and liquidity of the whole markets. The change can be 
seen from Table 1 that the percentage of tradable shares over shares outstanding has increased from 2007 to 2010 in 
A-share market. 
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respectively. Thus, B-share market Hurst exponent falls into the 95% confidence 
interval meaning there is 95% confidence that B-share time series follows a gBm. On 
the other hand, A-share market Hurst exponent is still outside of the 95% confidence 
interval indicating there is evidence that A-share market time series does not follow a 
gBm. If we use the Hurst exponent as the measurement of market efficiency, then we 
can tell the B-share market is much more efficient than the A-share market since the 
B-share market Hurst is closer to 0.5. In addition, the B-share market tends to be 
persistent while the A-share market is mean reverting11. Table 2 Panel C presents the 
total number of newly opened accounts for each year. In general, newly opened 
accounts in China’s stock markets can be divided into retail and institutional accounts. 
As we can see from Panel C, the numbers of newly opened retail and institutional 
accounts fluctuate over time.  
 
 
Figure 4 Newly Opened Accounts 
                                                 
11 Mean reversion, in general terms, is that a stock’s price tends to move to the average price over time. When the 
current market price is above the average price, the market price is expected to fall. In other words, deviations from 
the average price are expected to revert to the average.  
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Figure 4 visualizes the fluctuation of the number of newly opened accounts. We take 
the logarithm of the number of newly opened accounts for each year. As we can see, 
new retail and institutional accounts fluctuations are parallel. From 2005 to 2007, 
there is a significant growth in the number of the accounts for both retail and 
institutional accounts. For the period of 2003 to 2005 and 2007 to 2008, newly opened 
accounts decrease. The fluctuation is consistent with the business cycle. People tend to 
enter the stock market during periods of relatively rapid economic growth. 
 
 
Figure 5 A-Share Market Hurst Exponent Distribution 
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Figure 6 B-Share Market Hurst Exponent Distribution 
 
Figure 5 and 6 are histograms for the A- and B-share market Hurst exponents. Based 
on the discussion above, the range of H is from zero to one. Thus, we create bins with 
a 0.05 interval from 0 to 112. Then, we calculate the frequency for each bin. Figure 2 
shows the A-share market H distribution. Approximately 64% of the Hurst exponents 
fall into the range of 0.4 and 0.5. About 25% falls into (0.35, 0.4]. However, Figure 3 
shows a very different distribution from Figure 2. Over 65% of the B-share market 
Hurst exponents are in the range of 0.5 and 0.55. 34% falls into (0.55, 0.6]. B-share 
market Hurst exponents are more centralized close to 0.5, while A-share market Hurst 
exponents are distributed widely.  
                                                 
12 The raw Hurst exponent for A- and B-share market are reported in Appendix A 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
The panel data set enables us to establish a causal relationship between price 
differences and possible factors over time and across firms. Also, the panel nature of 
the data set allows us to control for idiosyncratic variation that could influence the 
price differences between the A- and B-share markets. Also, panel data methods can 
improve the precision of estimates of model dynamics in short time-series (e.g., Hsiao, 
1986). In addition to increasing degrees of freedom and generally reducing the 
collinearity among explanatory variables, fixed effects panel model has been 
established in this thesis. 
 
Based on the previous discussion of the determinates of the price disequilibrium, I 
perform a panel data analysis, which was also used by Domowitz et al. (1997), and 
Sun and Tong (1999). My regression model is as follows: 
 
Where  is the number of A share market Hurst exponent 
that fall into interval  for stock i at time t.  is the 
number of B share market Hurst exponent that fall into interval  for stock i at 
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time t.  is the interval ((k-1)/10, k/10]13.  is A,B 
share price differences divided by B-share price;  is the ratio of volatility 
(in A-share market over that in B-share market);  is the ratio of volume; 
 is number of shares outstanding;  is ratio of percentage of 
tradable shares;  is ratio of number of shareholders (in logarithm); 
 is ratio of institutional holdings (in logarithm);  
is the percentage change of newly registered retail accounts (in logarithm) from time t-
1 to time t;  is the percentage change of newly registered 
institutional accounts (in logarithm) from time t-1 to time t; , , 
, are dummy variables representing stock exchange, industry category, 
individual firm and year  
 
5.1 Description of variables 
 
The dependent variable in the model is , which is the A and B share price 
differences defined as (  - )/ , where  and  are 
quarterly-end prices of A and B shares. A shares are all traded in Chinese Yuan 
(RMB). B shares listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange are traded in U.S. dollars (USD), 
while those listed in Shenzhen Stock Exchange are traded in Hong Kong dollars 
(HKD). To unify the prices and calculate , all the prices are converted into 
USD by using quarterly-end exchange rates. Most of the time A shares are more 
expensive than their counterparts in the B share market; as a result,  are 
                                                 
13 The interval excludes ”(k-1)/10” and includes” k/10”. 
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almost all positive in the sample data.  
 
There are six numerical independent variables all in the form of ratios (A-share market 
over B-share market).  the percentage of tradable shares and 
 institutional holdings are the two  major variables represent the two 
ownership structures that may cause the price difference between A shares and 
matching B shares.  number of shares outstanding and number of 
shareholders capture the differential demand factors. Other two indicates the market 
general features—  market volatility and  turnover rate (daily 
average volume).  
 
1) Test ownership structure influences  
 and  are the two main variables in the model, 
representing two classes of ownership structures in China’s stock markets. Those 
variables are to test the hypothesis about the influence of ownership structures in 
China's stock markets on the price disequilibrium.  is the ratio of 
percentage of tradable shares in A-share market over tradable shares in B-share 
market. Tradable shares are shares that can be traded in the stock exchanges and are 
the real share supply in the market. Non-tradable shares are shares that held by the 
Chinese government or organizations that are backed by the government and cannot 
be traded in the stock exchanges. And most of the non-tradable shares are represented 
by state-owned shares or legal-person shares. Non-tradable shares are an unparalleled 
feature of the ownership structure of Chinese listed companies (Beltratti and 
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Bortolotti, 2006). The existence of non-tradable shares extremely limits free float 
available and makes the markets illiquid, volatile and speculative. The more shares are 
not tradable, the less the free float will be available in the market, and the higher stock 
prices will be.  
 
Another possible factor of ownership structure on the price difference is 
, which represents the relative institutional holdings (number of shares 
owned by institutional investors) between A shares and B shares. As a very important 
group of investors, institutional investors are considered to be more informed and 
experienced, and thus help to stabilize asset prices as suggested by most of academic 
literature. However, there is a number of studies show that institutional investors are 
associated with more volatile stocks. “Herding and positive feedback trading are the 
two main arguments put forward for the destabilizing impact on stock prices induced 
by institutional investors.” (Bohl and Brzeszczynski, 2006) To test the relationship 
between institutional ownership and the price difference, the null hypothesis is that 
there is no relationship between the ratio of relative institutional holdings and the A-
share premium. If institutional investors help with stock price stability, 
 (ratio of institutional holdings) will be negatively related to 
 (A-share premium) because the more shares held by institutional investors 
the closer the stock price will come toward its fundamental value and the smaller the 
price gap will be. If institutional investors are associated with disability of the market, 
the estimate will be positive indicating that institutions prefer risker stocks and drive 
the price difference between the two markets larger. When checking the assumptions 
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of the model, the residuals pattern of the institutional shares ratio is mostly scattered 
on the left hand side in the graphs, indicating a different residuals variance. Therefore, 
I use natural logarithm of this variable. The adjusted R square of the multi-regression 
is greatly improved after the transformation. 
 
2) Test the differential demand argument  
 and  represent the share demand and share supply in the markets 
respectively.  is the ratio of the number of shares outstanding in A-share market 
over B-share market, which represents the relative share supply in the two markets. In 
Sun and Tong (1999), they use shares outstanding as the supply of the market to test 
whether the demand curve is downward sloping. And they get a negative sign in the 
result, which demonstrates that when the supply of A shares increases relative to the 
supply of B shares, price pressure would push A-share prices to drop relative to B-
share prices. With the same expectation as Sun and Tong (1999), I expect that  
(number of shares outstanding) will be negatively related with  (A-share 
price premium).  is the ratio of number of shareholders in A-share 
market to that of B-share market. I use this variable as share demand in the model. 
Merton (1987) suggests that an increase in a firm's investor base increases the firm's 
value. Amihud, Mendelson and Uno (1999) find that a reduction in the minimum 
trading unit increases a firm's base of individual investors, and significantly increases 
stock liquidity and price. Further, the stock price appreciation drives an increase in the 
number of shareholders in return. To sum up, as a factor of share demand, the more 
investors in the market, the higher the prices will be. Thus, with the same expectation, 
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the relationship between  (number of shareholders) and  (A-
share premium) should be positive. I use natural logarithm of this variable because of 
left-scattered residual pattern. The adjusted R square of the multi-regression is greatly 
improved after the transformation. 
 
3) Test general factors  
The model also includes some general variables—  and , which 
are the ratio of volatility and turnover rate in the two market and representing relative 
speculative activities and liquidity levels. Sun and Tong (1999) test those two factors 
and find that they are significantly influence the price difference between the two 
markets.  is included in the model to test the speculative argument. It is 
calculated by the volatility of A shares divided by the volatility of B shares. Volatility 
is used to quantify the risk of the financial instrument over the specified time period. 
At the same time, the ratio of volatility is a way to capture the relative speculative 
activities of investors in the two markets: the excess of volatility of A shares over B 
shares can be explained by the relative excess of speculative activities. If A-share 
market is more speculative than B-share market, the relationship between  
(ratio of volatility) and  (A-share price premium) should be positive. 
 is the ratio of turnover rate (A shares over B shares). Volume rate is a 
liquidity variable. In Sun and Tong (1999), instead of using turnover rate as the 
liquidity proxy they use trading volume. As a ratio,  in the model is the 
indicator of relative liquidity levels between A- and B-share markets. If the B-share 
discount is due to lack of liquidity of B-share market, the  should be positively 
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related to  (A-share premium). 
 
4) Firm, industry, stock exchange and time effects  
Except for six numerical variables, there are four dummy variables in the model. 
 represents the stock exchanges. The reason that why I include this variable 
in the model is that the firms that listed in the two markets are quite different from 
each other. Specifically, the companies that listed in SSE are large-capital firms who 
have over 4 trillion capital stocks. On the contrary, the companies that listed in SZSE 
are usually much smaller with a capitalization of less than 1 trillion.  shows 
different industry categories and there are 7 types of industries associated in the data 
sample. Information Technology Industry, Manufacturing, Production & Supply of 
Power, Gas & Water, Real Estate, Social Services, Transportation & Storage, and 
Wholesale And Retail Trades. And  is the time factor in the model, which is from 
2001 and 2010. I include this variable in the model because as showed in Figure 1-1, 
the price difference changes over time, which indicates time variance exists in the 
sample. 
 
5) Test greater fool factors 
The explanatory variable will include the greater fool factors—
the percentage change of newly 
registered retail and institutional investor stock accounts respectively from time t-1 to 
time t. As mentioned in the literature review session, we utilize these two variables as 
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the proxies of the supply of greater fools. The more supply of greater fools, the higher 
chance to find one and sell the stocks and hence the higher prices.  
 
6) Test Hurst exponent 
Based on the previous discussion of the calculation of Hurst exponent, we create the 
bins (consecutive, non-overlapping intervals) for the value of H for both A share 
market and B share market. For each market, since the range of H is from zero to one 
so we divide the raw H into deciles so that each part represents 1/10 of the total 
number of H. We then count the number of Hs within each bin and record that number 
as our independent variable. Total number of H is 85. We use the bins instead of the 
raw value of H because the bins show the distribution of the continuous variable H and 
it will yield a clear result for each interval we interested. Given the feature and 
relationship between Hurst exponent and fBm, it helps us locate the relationship 
between a specific range of Hurst exponent and the price differences between A share 
and B share. In our regression,  represents the number of A 
share market Hs fall into the interval ((k-1)/10, k/10].  
represents the number of B share market Hs fall into the interval ((k-1)/10, k/10).  
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5.2 Results 
 
1) Regression results 
Table 3 Regression Results 
   Coef. Std. Err. T-Statistic 
A_bin_0.1 1.4195*  0.8577  1.65  
A_bin_0.2 0.2324  0.8385  0.28  
A_bin_0.3 0.5891  0.8164  0.72 
A_bin_0.4 -0.2063  0.8109  -0.26 
A_bin_0.5 -0.0007  0.8786  0.00 
A_bin_0.6 1.6057** 0.7720  2.09  
B_bin_0.5 -1.4824  0.8924  -1.42 
B_bin_0.6 -2.4317*** 0.9274  -2.70 
B_bin_0.7 -2.7646*** 0.8584  -3.23 
Volatility ratio 1.2473  0.8178  1.53  
Volume ratio 0.0026 * 0.0016  1.70  
# of shares outstating ratio 0.0276  0.1162  0.24  
Percentage of tradable shares ratio -0.3161  1.0307  -0.31  
# of shareholders ratio -1.9053*** 0.2039  -9.35  
Institutional holdings ratio -0.0709*** 0.0391  -1.82  
Retail accounts quarterly change 0.1691**  0.0852  -2.12 
Institutional accounts quarterly change -4.9099 ** 2.4596  -2.00 
Year YES   
Industry YES   
Exchange YES   
Observation 555    
Adj R2 0.8980    
* Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
***Significant at the 1% level.  
 
(a) Ownership structure factors 
For the ownership structure variables, the ratio of percentage of tradable shares in A-
share market to B-share market does not have a significant relationship with the price 
differences. However, our hypothesis is that the more shares tradable in A-share 
market over B-share market, the more the share supply will be in A-share market 
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relative to B-share market, and the lower the A-share prices will be relative to B-share 
prices. From the empirical results, we do not get a significant negative relationship 
between the ratio of tradable shares and A-share price premium. Another important 
factor of ownership structure is the institutional shares. From Table 3, the ratio of 
institutional shares of A-share market over B-share market is negatively related to the 
price differences (significant at the 1% level). In other words, the more institutional 
investors relatively in A-share market over B-share market, the smaller the A-share 
premium will be. And it is consistent with the hypothesis that institutional investors 
help to narrow the price difference. For the general variables, the ratio of volatility of 
A shares to B shares, which represents the relative speculative activities between A-
share and B-share markets is not significantly related to the price differences. This 
result does not support the speculation argument by Sun and Tong (1999)—the 
excessive speculative activities in A-share market than B-share market is one of the 
factors that enlarge the price difference between the two markets. The ratio of trading 
volume of A shares to B shares representing the relative liquidity of the two markets is 
significantly (at 10% level) related to the price differences. For the possible factors for 
share supply and share demand, the ratio of number of shareholders in A-share market 
over B-share market—has a negative sign in the regression results in Table 3, which is 
also unexpected and inconsistent with the hypothesis. As a variable of share demand, 
the more number of shareholders in A-share market relative to B-share market, the 
lower the A-share price premium should be. Our results are consistent with the 
hypothesis. The ratio of number of shareholders between A-share market and B-share 
market increases, the ratio of the shares demand between the two markets increases. 
  - 48 -
Thus, it will draw the A-share price down and decrease the price differences between 
A- and B-share markets.  
 
(b) Hurst exponent 
We regress the price differences between A- and B-share markets on the A- and B-
share market Hurst exponent. Instead of the raw Hurst exponent, we use the frequency 
bins. From Table 3, the Hurst exponent is not correlated to the price differences if H 
closes or equals to 0.5, as expected. Based on what we discussed above, H closes or 
equals to 0.5 indicates a standard Brownian motion. Thus, they shouldn’t impact the 
price differences. However, as one can see, for A-share market, the Hurst exponent in 
the range of (0.5, 0.6] tends to have a positive relationship with the price differences 
(significant at the 1% level). Basically, in the range of 0.5 and 0.6, if the stochastic 
process of the price in A-share market become a long-memory process, then it will 
increase the A price premium or the price differences between A- and B-share market. 
Likewise, in B-share market, if H closes or equals to 0.5, the Hurst exponent does not 
affect the price differences. Plus, the Hurst exponent in the range of (0.5, 0.6] or (0.6, 
0.7] is more likely to have a negative impact on the price differences between A- and 
B-share market (significant at the 1% level). Particularly, the B-share market becomes 
more persistent, and the price differences between A- and B-share market decrease.   
 
(c) Greater fool factors 
From Table 3, the percentage change of retail investors loads positively and 
significantly (significant at 5% level) against the price differences between the A- and 
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B-share markets. This is consistent with the Greater Fool Theory. More retail investors 
join in the market, higher the chance a greater fool could be found and higher the price 
spread between the A- and B-share markets. One explanation could be that more retail 
participants would increase the total turnover of the exchanges, hence, increasing the 
short-term volatility in the markets. The percentage change of institutional investors 
loads negatively and significantly (significant at 5% level) against the price 
differences. This is indicating the institutional investors are not qualified as greater 
fools. The risk taking capacity of institutional investors is far more than that of retail 
investors. So, that is why we see many institutional investors purchasing falling stocks 
or holding stocks even in the phase of a bear market14. Institutional investors have 
their own talented research teams which conduct a thorough stock research before 
investing. Thus, their investment behavior would basically help to correct the 
mispricing of the A- and B-share markets. Hence, more institutional participants join 
in the market would not decrease the price differences between A- and B-share 
markets.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 A market condition in which the prices of securities are falling, and widespread pessimism causes the negative 
sentiment to be self-sustaining. 
  - 50 -
2) Model Comparison 
Table 4 reports the comparison among the four models: the final model in our thesis, 
model without Hurst exponent’s variables, model without greater fool variables, and 
model without market friction variables. From the comparison table we can find that 
the final model has the highest adjusted  0.8980 indicating the highest significance 
among the models. Also, Mallow’s C statistic15 has been reported. The final model has 
the lowest Mallows’ C statistic which confirms that this model is the most significant 
model among the four models. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Mallows’ C statistic ( ) addresses the issue of overfitting. , where the error sum of 
squares, P is the number of regressors,  is the residual mean square, N is the sample size.  
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Table 4 Model Comparison 
 Final model Model w/o 
Hurst 
Model w/o 
Greater fool 
Model w/o 
Ownership 
A_bin_0.1 1.4195* 
(0.8577) 
- 1.5447* 
(0.7486) 
-0.1967 
(0.3495) 
A_bin_0.2 0.2324 
(0.8385) 
- 0.4313 
(0.7172) 
0.6788 
(0.3592) 
A_bin_0.3 0.5891 
(0.8164) 
- 0.8139 
(0.6867) 
1.9143 
(1.2156) 
A_bin_0.4 -0.2063 
(0.8109) 
- 0.1726 
(0.6928) 
0.5088 
(0.3805) 
A_bin_0.5 -0.0007 
(0.8786) 
- 0.5059 
(0.7763) 
0.2107 
(0.3368) 
A_bin_0.6 1.6057** 
(0.7720) 
- 1.8603** 
(0.6876) 
2.0662*** 
(0.3501) 
B_bin_0.5 -1.4824 
(0.8924) 
- -0.9033 
(0.7389) 
0.3709 
(0.3339) 
B_bin_0.6 -2.4317*** 
(0.9274) 
- -2.1088*** 
(0.7543) 
-0.5779 
(0.3583) 
B_bin_0.7 -2.7646*** 
(0.8584) 
- -2.4193*** 
(0.7054) 
-1.0233*** 
(0.3656) 
Volatility ratio 1.2473 
(0.8178) 
0.6217 
(0.8359) 
0.7398 
(0.7512) 
- 
Volume ratio 0.0026* 
(0.0016) 
0.0037** 
(0.0017) 
0.0022 
(0.0015) 
- 
# of shares outstating ratio 0.0276 
(0.1162) 
0.0972 
(0.1116) 
-0.0212 
(0.1044) 
- 
Percentage of tradable 
shares ratio 
-0.3161 
(1.0307) 
-1.2711 
(1.0497) 
0.1725 
(0.9254) 
- 
# of shareholders ratio -1.9053*** 
(0.2039) 
-1.7223*** 
(0.1916) 
-2.0297*** 
(0.1824) 
- 
Institutional holdings ratio -0.0709*** 
(0.0391) 
-0.1168*** 
(0.0411) 
-0.0797** 
(0.0365) 
- 
Retail accounts quarterly 
change 
0.1691** 
(0.0852) 
1.9397 
(3.0817) 
- 1.3454 
(1.5157) 
Institutional accounts 
quarterly change 
-4.9099 ** 
(2.4596) 
-3.7506 
(2.7069) 
- -1.2199 
(1.4998) 
Year YES YES YES YES 
Industry YES YES YES YES 
Exchange YES YES YES YES 
Observation 555  555 555  555 
Adj R2 0.8980  0.8734 0.8878 0.8311 
Mallows’ C Statistic 1116.4 1310.8 1249.5 1541.5 
* Significant at the 10% level.  
** Significant at the 5% level.  
***Significant at the 1% level.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study characterizes three major factors responsible to the price differences 
between A- and B-share markets: market friction, greater fool factor, and Hurst 
exponent (market efficiency) factor. We test whether these factors are empirically 
valid and statistically significant. The objective of this study has been fulfilled with a 
satisfactory result. First, the empirical tests find that the supply of greater fools is a 
force that drives the price differences between A- and B-share markets. Second, the 
overview of China’s stock markets shows that there is always a tremendous price gap 
between China’s A- and B-share markets and B shares have been traded at discount 
relative to matching A shares. By building up the regression model, the A-share 
premium can be explained by the ownership structure differences between the two 
markets. Specifically, the results show that in Chinese stock markets, institutional 
investors help to stabilize prices. As the number of institutional holdings in the A-
share market rises relative to B-share market, the price difference between the two 
markets decreases. It indicates that institutional investors help in narrowing down the 
price gap between A shares and B shares and it may due to their advantage in 
knowledge, experience, information over individual investors. The ratio of number of 
shares outstanding negatively related with A-share premium, as expected. Third, from 
the market efficacy point of view, the results are exactly consistent with the 
hypothesis. At Hurst exponent H=0.5, the coefficient is not statistically significant. In 
other word, if the prices are driven by a standard Brownian motion then they are not 
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responsible for the price differences between A- and B-share markets. However, if the 
Hurst exponent greater than 0.5 indicating the prices are persistent, then it will be 
responsible for the price differences. Some further improvement could be done on this 
study. First, we could further incorporate more psychology implements on how to 
explain between the Hurst exponent and the price differences. Second, a wider range 
of testing periods could be included if data in the earlier time has been revealed.  
 
Given the results of this study, the Chinese government could consider the following 
policies: invite more institutional investors into the markets; increase the number of 
shareholders and approve more retail investor stock accounts registrations. In the long 
run the Chinese government would merge A-share and B-share markets, since 
QFII27—the new tool for foreign investors to invest in Chinese stock market was 
created. The above policies may drive the A-share price down and decrease the price 
difference between A-share and B-share markets, and thus make the future mergence 
smooth and successful.  
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APPENDIX A: 85 CROSS-LISTING SHARES HURST EXPONENT IN CHINA’S 
A-SHARE AND B-SHARE MARKETS  
 
A-share Code A-share Hurst B-share Code B-share Hurst 
000002 CH Equity 0.531734  200002 CH Equity 0.524785  
000011 CH Equity 0.535534  200011 CH Equity 0.567514  
000012 CH Equity 0.518727  200012 CH Equity 0.547993  
000016 CH Equity 0.496460  200016 CH Equity 0.518048  
000017 CH Equity 0.523561  200017 CH Equity 0.597942  
000018 CH Equity 0.493296  200018 CH Equity 0.554237  
000019 CH Equity 0.485491  200019 CH Equity 0.546495  
000020 CH Equity 0.525809  200020 CH Equity 0.593472  
000022 CH Equity 0.485083  200022 CH Equity 0.520063  
000024 CH Equity 0.512994  200024 CH Equity 0.536536  
000025 CH Equity 0.511612  200025 CH Equity 0.585192  
000026 CH Equity 0.517513  200026 CH Equity 0.551894  
000028 CH Equity 0.482400  200028 CH Equity 0.542744  
000029 CH Equity 0.539391  200029 CH Equity 0.528275  
000030 CH Equity 0.539391  200030 CH Equity 0.611241  
000037 CH Equity 0.508288  200037 CH Equity 0.555687  
000039 CH Equity 0.507127  200039 CH Equity 0.557745  
000045 CH Equity 0.490081  200045 CH Equity 0.528825  
000055 CH Equity 0.466607  200055 CH Equity 0.505848  
000056 CH Equity 0.492837  200056 CH Equity 0.534888  
000058 CH Equity 0.530297  200058 CH Equity 0.534818  
000413 CH Equity 0.484888  200413 CH Equity 0.543423  
000418 CH Equity 0.526013  200418 CH Equity 0.541543  
000429 CH Equity 0.487303  200429 CH Equity 0.521521  
000488 CH Equity 0.494671  200488 CH Equity 0.540337  
000505 CH Equity 0.518427  200505 CH Equity 0.555367  
000513 CH Equity 0.516505  200513 CH Equity 0.552141  
000521 CH Equity 0.516661  200521 CH Equity 0.536649  
000530 CH Equity 0.478799  200530 CH Equity 0.528159  
000539 CH Equity 0.511962  200539 CH Equity 0.516359  
000541 CH Equity 0.495071  200541 CH Equity 0.524923  
000550 CH Equity 0.494620  200550 CH Equity 0.546749  
000553 CH Equity 0.511092  200553 CH Equity 0.538709  
000570 CH Equity 0.537471  200570 CH Equity 0.556897  
000581 CH Equity 0.529848  200581 CH Equity 0.550055  
000596 CH Equity 0.499719  200596 CH Equity 0.581812  
000613 CH Equity 0.561882  200613 CH Equity 0.594163  
000625 CH Equity 0.540101  200625 CH Equity 0.570986  
000725 CH Equity 0.524998  200725 CH Equity 0.556411  
000726 CH Equity 0.521677  200726 CH Equity 0.535143  
000761 CH Equity 0.512012  200761 CH Equity 0.555068  
  - 55 -
000869 CH Equity 0.484435  200869 CH Equity 0.535266  
600054 CH Equity 0.487170  900942 CH Equity 0.531678  
600190 CH Equity 0.491596  900952 CH Equity 0.535736  
600221 CH Equity 0.505693  900945 CH Equity 0.524372  
600272 CH Equity 0.432913  900943 CH Equity 0.538875  
600295 CH Equity 0.500556  900936 CH Equity 0.540658  
600320 CH Equity 0.491997  900947 CH Equity 0.544165  
600555 CH Equity 0.217980  900955 CH Equity 0.533109  
600602 CH Equity 0.497222  900901 CH Equity 0.529464  
600604 CH Equity 0.529907  900902 CH Equity 0.565974  
600610 CH Equity 0.516098  900906 CH Equity 0.572715  
600611 CH Equity 0.527476  900903 CH Equity 0.548287  
600612 CH Equity 0.489286  900905 CH Equity 0.559811  
600613 CH Equity 0.483976  900904 CH Equity 0.548409  
600614 CH Equity 0.513611  900907 CH Equity 0.576298  
600617 CH Equity 0.486111  900913 CH Equity 0.563497  
600618 CH Equity 0.482013  900908 CH Equity 0.537668  
600619 CH Equity 0.434846  900910 CH Equity 0.515382  
600623 CH Equity 0.517677  900909 CH Equity 0.542126  
600639 CH Equity 0.479684  900911 CH Equity 0.526131  
600648 CH Equity 0.467026  900912 CH Equity 0.517767  
600650 CH Equity 0.466777  900914 CH Equity 0.521028  
600663 CH Equity 0.488528  900932 CH Equity 0.535976  
600679 CH Equity 0.523368  900916 CH Equity 0.550941  
600680 CH Equity 0.472737  900930 CH Equity 0.531627  
600689 CH Equity 0.471753  900922 CH Equity 0.538226  
600695 CH Equity 0.485757  900919 CH Equity 0.548084  
600698 CH Equity 0.553239  900946 CH Equity 0.559895  
600726 CH Equity 0.512447  900937 CH Equity 0.547855  
600751 CH Equity 0.556355  900938 CH Equity 0.586708  
600754 CH Equity 0.474558  900934 CH Equity 0.524987  
600776 CH Equity 0.490666  900941 CH Equity 0.515746  
600801 CH Equity 0.508486  900933 CH Equity 0.581152  
600818 CH Equity 0.509548  900915 CH Equity 0.527424  
600819 CH Equity 0.508584  900918 CH Equity 0.534283  
600822 CH Equity 0.454957  900927 CH Equity 0.526507  
600827 CH Equity 0.500021  900923 CH Equity 0.517024  
600835 CH Equity 0.522104  900925 CH Equity 0.534636  
600841 CH Equity 0.454021  900920 CH Equity 0.530621  
600843 CH Equity 0.466789  900924 CH Equity 0.539435  
600844 CH  Equity 0.532910  900921 CH Equity 0.587280  
600845 CH Equity 0.468026  900926 CH Equity 0.541766  
600848 CH Equity 0.532135  900928 CH Equity 0.559490  
600851 CH Equity 0.531402  900917 CH Equity 0.554107  
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APPENDIX B: OVERVIEW OF 85 CROSS-LISTING STOCKS 
A-share 
Code 
B-share 
Code 
Industry Date Full Shares Tradable 
Shares 
Listed in HK 
market 
C000002  200002  Real Estate  2001-12-31  121,755,136  121,755,136  N  
C000002  200002  Real Estate  2010-12-31  1,314,955,468 1,314,955,468  N  
C000011  200011  Real Estate  2001-12-31  61,459,312  61,459,312  N  
C000011  200011  Real Estate  2010-12-31  67,605,243  67,605,243  N  
C000012  200012  Metal, Nonmetal  2001-12-31  299,052,546  299,052,546  N  
C000012  200012  Metal, Nonmetal  2010-12-31  762,583,992  762,583,992  N  
C000016  200016  Electronic  2001-12-31  202,837,902  202,837,902  N  
C000016  200016  Electronic  2010-12-31  405,675,804  405,675,804  N  
C000017  200017  Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument  
2001-12-31  178,620,649  178,620,649  N  
C000017  200017  Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument  
2010-12-31  248,362,982  248,362,982  N  
C000018  200018  Textile, Clothing, Fur  2001-12-31  69,421,903  69,421,903  N  
C000018  200018  Textile, Clothing, Fur  2010-12-31  69,421,903  69,421,903  N  
C000019  200019  Food And Beverage  2001-12-31  26,136,000  26,136,000  N  
C000019  200019  Food And Beverage  2010-12-31  26,136,000  26,136,000  N  
C000020  200020  Information Technology 
Industry  
2001-12-31  101,995,836  101,995,836  N  
C000020  200020  Information Technology 
Industry  
2010-12-31  101,995,836  101,995,836  N  
C000022  200022  Transportation, Storage  2001-12-31  106,447,000  106,447,000  N  
C000022  200022  Transportation, Storage  2010-12-31  179,611,983  179,611,983  N  
C000024  200024  Transportation, Storage  2001-12-31  136,221,800  136,221,800  N  
C000024  200024  Real Estate  2010-12-31  141,633,850  141,633,850  N  
C000025  200025  Wholesale And Retail 
Trades  
2001-12-31  26,400,000  26,400,000  N  
C000025  200025  Wholesale And Retail 
Trades  
2010-12-31  26,400,000  26,400,000  N  
C000026  200026  Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument  
2001-12-31  58,320,000  58,320,000  N  
C000026  200026  Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument  
2010-12-31  58,320,000  58,320,000  N  
C000028  200028  Wholesale And Retail 
Trades  
2001-12-31  54,885,600  54,885,600  N  
C000028  200028  Wholesale And Retail 
Trades  
2010-12-31  54,885,600  54,885,600  N  
C000029  200029  Real Estate  2001-12-31  120,000,000  120,000,000  N  
C000029  200029  Real Estate  2010-12-31  120,000,000  120,000,000  N  
C000030  200030  2001-12-31  39,600,000  39,600,000  N  
C000030  200030  Papermaking, Printing  2010-12-31  39,600,000  39,600,000  N  
C000037  200037  Production & Supply Of 
Power, Gas & Water  
2001-12-31  108,565,928  108,565,928  N  
C000037  200037  Production & Supply Of 
Power, Gas & Water  
2010-12-31  263,854,446  263,854,446  N  
C000039  200039  Metal, Nonmetal  2001-12-31  142,403,801  142,403,801  N  
C000039  200039  Metal, Nonmetal  2010-12-31  1,430,478,709 1,430,478,709  N  
C000045  200045  Textile, Clothing, Fur  2001-12-31  33,000,000  33,000,000  N  
C000045  200045  Textile, Clothing, Fur  2010-12-31  49,500,000  49,500,000  N  
C000055  200055  Metal, Nonmetal  2001-12-31  145,368,000  145,368,000  N  
C000055  200055  Metal, Nonmetal  2010-12-31  223,967,460  223,967,460  N  
C000056  200056  Wholesale And Retail 
Trades  
2001-12-31  72,000,000  72,000,000  N  
C000056  200056  Wholesale And Retail 
Trades  
2010-12-31  101,688,192  101,688,192  N  
C000058  200058  Electronic  2001-12-31  228,041,727  228,041,727  N  
C000058  200058  Electronic  2010-12-31  246,461,318  246,461,318  N  
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C000413  200413  Electronic  2001-12-31  100,000,000  100,000,000  N  
C000413  200413  Electronic  2010-12-31  100,000,000  100,000,000  N  
C000418  200418  Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument  
2001-12-31  127,357,248  127,357,248  N  
C000418  200418  Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument  
2010-12-31  160,184,158  160,184,158  N  
C000429  200429  Transportation, Storage  2001-12-31  303,750,000  303,750,000  N  
C000429  200429  Transportation, Storage  2010-12-31  348,750,000  348,750,000  N  
C000488  200488  Papermaking, Printing  2001-12-31  206,480,550  206,480,550  N  
C000488  200488  Papermaking, Printing  2010-12-31  557,497,485  557,497,485  Y  
C000505  200505  Real Estate  2001-12-31  57,500,000  57,500,000  N  
C000505  200505  Real Estate  2010-12-31  64,975,000  64,975,000  N  
C000513  200513  Medicine, Biologic 
Products  
2001-12-31  122,306,984  122,306,984  N  
C000513  200513  Medicine, Biologic 
Products  
2010-12-31  111,993,354  111,993,354  N  
C000521  200521  Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument  
2001-12-31  113,100,000  113,100,000  N  
C000521  200521  Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument  
2010-12-31  113,100,000  113,100,000  N  
C000530  200530  Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument  
2001-12-31  115,000,000  115,000,000  N  
C000530  200530  Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument  
2010-12-31  115,000,000  115,000,000  N  
C000539  200539  Production & Supply Of 
Power, Gas & Water  
2001-12-31  665,340,000  665,340,000  N  
C000539  200539  Production & Supply Of 
Power, Gas & Water  
2010-12-31  665,326,500  665,326,500  N  
C000541  200541  Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument  
2001-12-31  82,500,000  82,500,000  N  
C000541  200541  Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument  
2010-12-31  225,225,000  225,225,000  N  
C000550  200550  Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument  
2001-12-31  344,000,000  344,000,000  N  
C000550  200550  Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument  
2010-12-31  344,000,000  344,000,000  N  
C000553  200553  Petroleum, Chemical, 
Rubber, Plastic  
2001-12-31  115,000,000  115,000,000  N  
C600602  900901  Electronic  2010-12-31  293,370,465  293,370,465  N  
C600604  900902  Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument  
2001-12-31  232,925,000  232,925,000  N  
C600604  900902  Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument  
2010-12-31  232,925,000  232,925,000  N  
C600611  900903  Social Services  2001-12-31  202,800,000  202,800,000  N  
C600611  900903  Social Services  2010-12-31  533,871,000  533,871,000  N  
C600613  900904  Transmitting, Culture 
Industry  
2001-12-31  45,626,375  45,626,375  N  
C600613  900904  Social Services  2010-12-31  45,626,375  45,626,375  N  
C600612  900905  2001-12-31  120,051,360  120,051,360  N  
C600612  900905  Wholesale And Retail 
Trades  
2010-12-31  132,056,496  132,056,496  N  
C600610  900906  Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument  
2001-12-31  120,120,000  120,120,000  N  
C600610  900906  Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument  
2010-12-31  120,120,000  120,120,000  N  
C600614  900907  Petroleum, Chemical, 
Rubber, Plastic  
2001-12-31  41,745,000  41,745,000  N  
C600822  900927  Wholesale And Retail 
Trades  
2001-12-31  66,550,000  66,550,000  N  
C600822  900927  Wholesale And Retail 
Trades  
2010-12-31  99,825,006  99,825,006  N  
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C600848  900928  Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument  
2001-12-31  107,145,500  107,145,500  N  
C600848  900928  Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument  
2010-12-31  107,145,500  107,145,500  N  
C600680  900930  Information Technology 
Industry  
2001-12-31  124,800,000  124,800,000  N  
C600680  900930  Information Technology 
Industry  
2010-12-31  124,800,000  124,800,000  N  
C600663  900932  Real Estate  2001-12-31  509,600,000  509,600,000  N  
C600663  900932  Real Estate  2010-12-31  509,600,000  509,600,000  N  
C600801  900933  Metal, Nonmetal  2001-12-31  164,000,000  164,000,000  N  
C600801  900933  Metal, Nonmetal  2010-12-31  78,238,700  78,238,700  N  
C600754  900934  Social Services  2001-12-31  156,000,000  156,000,000  N  
C600754  900934  Social Services  2010-12-31  156,000,000  156,000,000  N  
C600295  900936  Textile, Clothing, Fur  2001-12-31  210,000,000  210,000,000  N  
C600295  900936  Textile, Clothing, Fur  2010-12-31  420,000,000  420,000,000  N  
C600726  900937  Production & Supply Of 
Power, Gas & Water  
2001-12-31  432,000,000  432,000,000  N  
C600726  900937  Production & Supply Of 
Power, Gas & Water  
2010-12-31  432,000,002  432,000,002  N  
C600751  900938  Transportation, Storage  2001-12-31  180,000,000  180,000,000  N  
C600751  900938  Transportation, Storage  2010-12-31  180,000,000  180,000,000  N  
C600776  900941  Information Technology 
Industry  
2001-12-31  150,000,000  150,000,000  N  
C600776  900941  Information Technology 
Industry  
2010-12-31  300,000,000  300,000,000  N  
C600054  900942  Social Services  2001-12-31  104,000,000  104,000,000  N  
C600054  900942  Social Services  2010-12-31  156,000,000  156,000,000  N  
C600272  900943  Textile, Clothing, Fur  2001-12-31  80,000,000  80,000,000  N  
C600272  900943  Integrated  2010-12-31  80,000,000  80,000,000  N  
C600221  900945  Transportation, Storage  2001-12-31  76,680,000  76,680,000  N  
C600221  900945  Transportation, Storage  2010-12-31  184,723,201  184,723,201  N  
C600698  900946  Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument  
2001-12-31  230,000,000  230,000,000  N  
C600698  900946  Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument  
2010-12-31  230,000,000  230,000,000  N  
C600320  900947  Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument  
2001-12-31  110,000,000  110,000,000  N  
C600320  900947  Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument  
2010-12-31  858,000,000  858,000,000  N  
C600190  900952  Transportation, Storage  2001-12-31  166,500,000  166,500,000  N  
C600190  900952  Transportation, Storage  2010-12-31  222,806,970  222,806,970  N  
C600555  900955  Textile, Clothing, Fur  2001-12-31  110,000,000  110,000,000  N  
C600555  900955  Social Services  2010-12-31  330,000,000  330,000,000  N  
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